Abstract: Technology has facilitated both the amount of trade secrets that are now stored electronically, and the rise of cyber intrusions. Together, this has created a storm perfectly ripe for economic espionage. Cases involving unknown or anonymous offenders who may not be in the United States and who steal trade secrets using remote access tools ("RATs") are especially problematic. This Article is the first to address and place trade secret misappropriation within the larger backdrop of cybersecurity. First, it argues that systemic issues related to technology will continue to make legislative and judicial solutions suboptimal for cyber misappropriation. Second, it explores how the rhetoric of war has infiltrated the national discourse on cybersecurity and cyber misappropriation. Third, the Article introduces and coins the acronym TRAP. Standing for "technologically responsive active protection," TRAP serves as a guiding principle to further refine the reasonable efforts requirement for the protection of trade secrets. The Article also critically examines such active defense counterstrike techniques as hacking back and the controversy surrounding this potential strategy.
INTRODUCTION
Trade secrets are arguably more important to companies now than ever before in our history. In fact, since the most recent revisions to our patent laws, many believe that trade secrets might be even more important than patents.
I. THE THREAT OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
The reports, surveys, and stories are plentiful and paint a vivid picture. A cyber espionage unit of the Chinese army breached 115 American companies over the course of several years. 16 Companies are being attacked at least once a week. 17 Cyber criminals have stolen up to $1 trillion worth of intellectual property in a single year. 18 It is no wonder then that cybersecurity is treated as a national security matter, not just one related to criminal or intellectual property law. 19 Indeed, the narrative and rhetoric in the media, as well as among politicians, tends to make national security the focus of the problem. 20 The government has also taken note and focused attention on the problem. 21 Although that attention is a welcome and necessary component to combating these challenges, the question arises as to what role the private sector ought to play in the process, and whether the importance of that role is diminished by the national security focus.
International espionage of American trade secrets continues to receive increasing attention. 22 In early February 2013, a government report detailed the "unrelenting campaign of cyberstealing linked to the Chinese government." 23 The report identified a group of hackers run by the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Unit 61398, 24 and described a "sophisticated, systematic effort that is allegedly condoned, supported, and directed by the Chinese government." 25 Shortly thereafter, President Obama announced new efforts to prevent the theft of U.S. trade secrets abroad. 26 The White House coordinator of intellectual property enforcement laid out the "whole of government" efforts that would be utilized to combat international theft of U.S. trade secrets. 27 The White House strategy consisted of five components:
First, we will increase our diplomatic engagement [and] convey our concerns to countries where there are high incidents of trade secret theft . . . . Second, we will support industry-led efforts to develop best practices to protect trade secrets . . . . Third, [the Department of Justice] will continue to make the investigation and prosecution of trade secret theft by foreign competitors and foreign governments a top priority. . . . Fourth, . . . we will conduct a review of our laws to determine if further changes are needed to enhance enforcement. . . . Lastly, we will increase public awareness of the threats and risks to the U.S. economy posed by trade secret theft. 28 The precise numbers and actual extent of economic espionage is difficult to ascertain. 29 General Keith Alexander, former Director of the National Security Agency and Chair of the U.S. Cyber Command, has indicated that the amount of intellectual property theft in the United States through cyber espionage is "astounding." 30 Estimates are that we lose hundreds of billions of dollars annually, both from the public and private sector, as a result of this kind of activity. 31 For a whole host of reasons, however, an accurate number is difficult . 28 Espinel, supra note 27; see Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Said to Be Target of Massive CyberEspionage Campaign, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2013) , https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-said-to-be-target-of-massive-cyber-espionage-campaign/2013/02/10/7b4687d8-6fc1-11e2-aa58-243de81040ba_story.html [https://perma.cc/N8FV-SM3W] ("The problem with foreign cyberespionage is not that it is an existential threat, but that it is invisible, and invisibility promotes inaction."). 29 See Rowe & Mahfood, supra note 8, at 68 . 30 See Keith Alexander, Remarks on Cyber Security Threats to the U.S. (July 9, 2012) http:// www.c-span.org/video/?306956-1/cybersecurity-threats-us (commenting on the rate of intellectual property theft at minute 42:36). 31 See, e.g., to calculate. For one thing, companies often are not aware that they have been victimized. 32 Even when discovered, there is no reliable method for determining and estimating actual losses. Rather, it is left to each individual company to disclose the amount of its loss, if it chooses to acknowledge or publicly disclose at all.
It is unlikely that new legislation will adequately address the breadth of problems presented by economic espionage and cyber misappropriation. 33 Recent attempts at trade legislation have yielded only partial and limited fixes. 34 The reality is that risks are everywhere, whether they are malware-based attacks, intrusions on networks, potential attacks on mobile devices, or potential cloud-based attacks. 35 Thoughtful consideration of this complex issue requires recognition of its place within the larger context of cybersecurity, where all kinds of information, from personal consumer information to military secrets, can be targeted. In that vein, cyber misappropriation-defined here as the theft of trade secrets resulting from cyberattacks-is intertwined with the national discourse on and rhetoric that accompanies cyberattacks, as well as the shortcomings of existing laws that govern trade secret misappropriation. 32 See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (Part II.C.2). 33 See generally Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317 (2015) (critiquing and providing arguments against addressing the issue of trade secrecy through federal legislation). 34 See Rowe & Mahfood, supra note 8, at 69 (discussing ineffective attempts at legislative fixes). For example,
[T]he Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012 . . . amended the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) by expanding the scope of prohibited conduct and increasing the maximum penalties. The amendment closes the loophole identified in United States v. Aleynikov . . . by redefining a trade secret to include processes used internally in connection with services used in commerce. In addition, the Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012 increased penalties for violations of the EEA, but only for those in § 1831, which targets only trade secret theft intended to benefit a foreign government, agent, or instrumentality. Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 112-269, 126 Stat. 2442 (2013); 18 U.S.C. § 1831. These amendments, while potentially helpful in a handful of specific contexts, offer only a piecemeal approach to addressing a problem that would be more effectively and comprehensively addressed by increasing the usefulness of laws that already exist. In this way, and by creating a perception that the problem has been solved, relatively modest legislative modifications have the potential to do more harm than good.
Id. at 69 n.35 (citations omitted)
. 35 See generally SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT 20, at 6 (2015), https://www4. symantec.com/mktginfo/whitepaper/ISTR/21347932_GA-internet-security-threat-report-volume-20-2015-social_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8KD-22VM] ("identify [ing] , analyz [ing] , and provid [ing] informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam").
II. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE WEAPONS
The two main pieces of legislation that can be used to address the misappropriation of trade secrets through cyber misappropriation at a national level are the Economic Espionage Act ("EEA") 36 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"). 37 Along with the CFAA, there are a number of other federal laws that address or touch on cybersecurity, including several regulations within the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission. 38 For the purposes of this Article, however, these other federal laws and regulations are not directly applicable.
A. The Economic Espionage Act
To date, the EEA is the only federal law on trade secret misappropriation in the United States. It is a criminal statute. Although there have been repeated calls for a federal civil law on trade secret misappropriation, there is currently no civil counterpart to the EEA. Additionally, unlike the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, discussed in section B below, 39 the EEA does not currently create a private right of action. 40 Generally, the EEA gives federal authorities, under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Justice and local federal prosecutors, the power to investigate and prosecute individuals or companies who engage in criminal trade secret misappropriation. 41 Judging from the indictments that have been brought under the EEA, the vast majority of prosecutions involve employees, former employees, and other company "insiders."
42 Acts of corporate espionage by outsiders, however, are also covered by the EEA. 43 The prototypical EEA case involves employees who violate their duty of confidentiality or loyalty by using or disclosing their employer's confidential business information. For example, in July 2010, two individuals were indicted for stealing and selling $40 million worth of trade secret information related to General Motors' hybrid automobile plans. 44 The allegations were that the employees downloaded and saved confidential General Motors' documents and then gave the information to a Chinese automaker. This is representative of a large number of EEA prosecutions in which Chinese nationals are overrepresented relative to other countries. 45 Sections 1831 and 1832 of the EEA define the prohibited conduct under the Act. 46 Moreover, the decision of which of the two sections to apply turns on whether the theft was intended to benefit a foreign government. If so, the conduct falls under § 1831. 47 Section 1832, in contrast, governs all other thefts of trade secrets. 48 It applies when there is "intent to convert a trade secret . . . related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce." 49 The accused must intend or know that the conversion will harm the trade secret owner. 50 Both § 1831 and § 1832 make an attempt to steal and a conspiracy to steal trade secrets a crime. 51 Thus, it is conceivable that someone may be prosecuted under the EEA even though no trade secrets were, in fact, stolen. As one court has explained: "[T]o find a defendant guilty of conspiracy, the prosecution must prove (1) that an agreement existed, (2) that it had an unlawful purpose, and (3) that the defendant was a voluntary participant."
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Section 1839 of the EEA defines trade secrets broadly.
53 A "trade secret" is information that "the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep . . . secret," and that "derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public." 54 In order to establish a violation of the EEA, federal government prosecutors must prove: "(1) that the information is actually secret because it is neither known to, nor readily ascertainable by, the public; (2) that the owner took reasonable measures to maintain that secrecy; and (3) that independent economic value was derived from that secrecy." 55 The language of § 1839(3) further provides that information is to be protected regardless of its form. 56 Thus, information in electronic or intangible form is pro- 45 Based on the author's examination of EEA indictments from 2008 to 2013, thirty-two of fifty defendants were Chinese nationals. The countries with the next highest numbers were South Korea (eight) and the United States (five). The sources consulted for this analysis are on file with the author. 46 tected under the EEA. It is significant that the drafters of the Act (in the early 1990s) had the foresight to include this coverage, given that virtually all trade secret misappropriation today, especially cyber misappropriation, involves trade secrets stored electronically.
In order to address the concern that foreign governments and foreign entities are attempting to steal U.S. trade secrets, the reach of the EEA extends outside the boundaries of the United States. If the theft of a trade secret occurs in a foreign country, jurisdiction may be asserted if: (a) the defendant is a U.S. citizen or corporation, or (b) any "act in furtherance of the offense" was perpetrated within the United States. 57 Unfortunately, this provision has not proven sufficiently useful to be widely utilized. Part of the reason is because prosecutors do not have the appropriate enforcement and service mechanisms to use against individuals who are outside of the United States.
The number of prosecutions under the EEA has been relatively low. Since the Act was passed in 1996, there have been about 100 indictments and few convictions. 58 One reason for this paucity is the fact that prosecutors are unlikely to use their limited resources to prosecute an economic crime where the victim-company has a readily available, and perhaps better suited, civil cause of action and remedy. Many companies also choose not to report espionage to the government for prosecution, with one report noting that in 2005, only about fifteen percent of detected incidents were reported to law enforcement.
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Commentators have speculated as to why that may be the case. 60 There are several reasons why a trade secret owner may be disinclined to report a trade secret misappropriation claim to criminal authorities. First, if a report is filed and a criminal prosecution is brought, the trade secret owner effectively loses control of the situation and any parallel civil case may be stayed pending resolution of the criminal case. Second, because the trade secret owner lacks control of criminal proceedings, there is a greater risk that its trade secrets will be exposed (and thereby lost) during the criminal proceeding. Third, there is often a public relations concern if news of trade secret misappropriation becomes public, particularly for publicly-traded companies whose stock prices may be negatively affected. 57 
B. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is a federal law that was adopted (before the advent of the commercial use of the Internet) to address the problem of computer hacking, and it does not directly address trade secret misappropriation. 61 Unlike the EEA, however, it includes a private right of action that some plaintiffs use to bring state trade secret claims before the federal courts. The CFAA makes it a crime for anyone to intentionally access a computer without authorization, or surpass authorization, in order to access "information from any protected computer."
62 Because the principal wrongdoing as defined by the CFAA is "accessing a protected computer," its provisions conceptually overlap with the improper acquisition provisions of trade secret law. 63 Thus, if the facts of a trade secret case involve the acquisition of trade secrets that are stored on a computer, the plaintiff in a civil trade secret case might also pursue a criminal prosecution under the CFAA.
Whether the defendant's access to the subject computer was unauthorized or exceeded existing authorization is at the heart of a CFAA claim. Of particular concern is whether a violation of ubiquitous "terms of use agreements" can make some activities "unauthorized" for purposes of the CFAA.
64 Similar concerns are raised with respect to common provisions of employment agreements and confidentiality agreements that limit computer access.
Sometimes the CFAA, in effect, serves as a federal trade secret law. It can be used to capture those who intentionally access a protected computer without authorization, regardless of whether or not the information accessed was a trade secret. 65 Some courts have interpreted the statute broadly to create liability where employees access data in violation of a general duty of loyalty or confidentiality to the employer. Thus, although the employee may have had access to the computers, violating an employment policy or exceeding authorization to access certain information can create liability. 66 Other courts interpret the statute more narrowly, requiring unauthorized access to the computers ra- 61 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 62 Id. § 1030(2)(C). 63 ther than merely unauthorized use of information. 67 The broader interpretation creates liability not just for hacking, but for any unauthorized appropriation or use of the data.
It is also worth noting in the context of this Article that the broad framework provided under the CFAA for addressing cyberattacks may also threaten the legitimate work of security researchers. That is because some of the activities and processes that are necessary to identify and assess weaknesses in cybersecurity arguably violate the CFAA. 68 Researchers have complained that when they identify vulnerabilities or bugs in systems and disclose their findings to manufacturers, technology providers, or those otherwise responsible for repairing such weaknesses, they have been threatened with legal action both civilly and criminally. 69 As a result, there have been calls to clarify the CFAA or to explicitly exempt these kinds of research activities from its reach. 70 
C. Why Law Is Not the Answer
The EEA cases almost all involve employees who obtained their employer's trade secrets and transferred them to a competitor, often a foreign competitor. For example, a product development manager downloaded dozens of files containing confidential product information and transferred them to a competitor. 71 A design engineer transported stolen "data sheets" containing his employer's proprietary information to a potential foreign competitor. 72 An employee stole his employer's back-up tapes and offered them for sale to a com-petitor. 73 Finally, an information technology specialist sold his employer's confidential information for $3 million dollars. 74 Sometimes it is not employees who steal trade secrets, but third parties or others with access to information. In one case, a college student stole sensitive trade secrets belonging to DirecTV while he was working for a copying service employed by DirecTV's outside counsel. 75 In another case, two Harvard Medical School post-doctoral research fellows were accused of stealing marketable scientific information belonging to Harvard. 76 The pair shipped more than thirty boxes of biologicals, books, and documents to a competing lab. 77 They then further collaborated with a Japanese company in the creation and sale of related and derivative products, and otherwise capitalized on the information.
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A deeper analysis of the scenarios presented in the facts of these cases reveals some underlying, systemic issues related to technology that will continue to make legislative and judicial solutions suboptimal for cyber misappropriation. Subsection 1 explores how the nature of trade secret information as intangible makes security a challenge. 79 Subsection 2 discusses how the nature of the information through the architecture of the Internet makes it difficult to identify offenders. 80 Finally, subsection 3 examines how, because the Internet has increased the likelihood of offenders being outside of the country, prosecution can be even further hindered. 81 
Intangible Information
Trade secret law is the primary area of intellectual property law that covers how we control, protect, acquire, and use information. But this kind of "property" right in information presents a huge challenge because of its present-day form as electronically stored data. The intangible nature of information has significant implications for how we regulate and control that in-formation and others' use of it. Indeed, in some ways it is akin to trying to capture air. With real property we can build fences, use locks, and attach alarms. Traditionally, that was the model that we used and developed to protect trade secrets. 82 A new day has come, however, and that model may not serve as well going forward.
The prevalence of cyber misappropriation makes evident the fact that how we capture, corral, and lock up proprietary information has left us wanting and needing more effective mechanisms and tools, from both a legal and business perspective, to better protect our information. In this digital age, securing information can be especially daunting because once a trade secret has been disclosed, even inadvertently, it ceases to be considered as such and loses all protection (unlike a patent). 83 This makes trade secrets extremely vulnerable, and makes misappropriation easier and more prevalent than ever before. 
Identifying Culprits
The intangible nature of information, when taken from its owner, makes detection of the loss and identification of the culprits particularly difficult. 85 When a trade secret stored in electronic form is stolen, the misappropriator has often taken a copy of the data but left the original intact and in place. 86 Accordingly, it may be a while before anyone notices that the information has been taken, and weeks, months, sometimes even years may pass before the loss is detected.
This delay through the passage of time in and of itself reduces the likelihood that the offender, particularly if he or she was not an employee, might be identified. Granted, if the perpetrator is an employee it can be easier to track and make an identification from the company's computer logs upon discovery of the misappropriation. But when the culprit is on the outside, the situation is more challenging. Compounding the problem is the fact that the architecture of the Internet allows for disguises and makes it difficult to trace the source of an intrusion. Observing certain patterns to identify hackers is not a reliable way to 82 See Rowe, supra note 7, at 9-10. 83 identify the source of a hack. Sometimes hackers share tools, which makes it even harder to identify or tie certain tactics to a particular group. 87 It is also possible to hire an independent hacker to infiltrate a system, thus making identification of the true source even more difficult. 88 This can be especially challenging if a hacker is working outside of the country.
Cross-Border Incidents
Because it is easier to access intangible information from anywhere in the world, and to do so in a manner that is unlikely to be detected, the Internet has thus vastly expanded the potential threat of actors successfully reaching and accessing American trade secrets. Even when foreign offenders are identified and espionage charges may be filed under the EEA, prosecution in the United States can be severely hindered. Complicating prosecution is the fact that offenders who live outside the United States would need to be extradited back to the United States, and not all countries permit extradition for these types of offenses. 89 Although the EEA includes a provision for extraterritorial jurisdiction for acts of trade secret misappropriation even if outside the United States, in practice it is not a meaningful remedy. 90 Prosecutors do not have the appropriate enforcement and service mechanisms with which to serve individuals and entities that are not located in the United States. In reality, violators cannot fully be charged and indicted under a system unless and until they are within its borders.
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III. WHY CYBERWAR IS NOT THE ANSWER
In any discussion of cybersecurity, the rhetoric of war from the government is hard to miss. We are "fighting a cyber-war;" 92 we are at risk for a "cyber-Pearl Harbor."
93 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, 87 See, e.g., MANDIANT CONSULTING, M-TRENDS: THE ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT 2 (2010), https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZGV-7GND] (noting inability to determine identities of attackers); see also DMITRI ALPEROVITCH, MCAFEE, RE-VEALED: OPERATION SHADY RAT 4, 6 (2011), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/ wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG99-RSYV] (same). 88 See ONCIX REPORT, supra note 85, at 1. 89 cyberattacks can constitute an "act of war."
94 Words and phrases like attacks, strikes, cyber operations, national security threats, cyber warfare, waging war, geopolitical assaults, and digital battlefield have become commonplace in the narrative about cybersecurity. 95 This Part will evaluate the use and implications of the choice of this rhetoric, and draw parallels to the War on Drugs from the 1980s that might be instructive in placing this current societal challenge against a backdrop of a similarly complex historical issue implicating law and culture. 96 The rhetoric of war can also be a political marketing tool used to persuade the public to support certain public policy issues. 97 Along with the "War on Drugs" we have had the "War on Poverty," the "Cold War," and the "War on Terror." 98 This metaphorical militaristic rhetoric encourages a focus on a specific enemy that threatens national security (directly or indirectly), potentially frightens or motivates the public to mobilize against the enemy, and engages in a struggle to win no matter how high the financial or other costs (including sometimes those related to civil liberties).
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This is not to suggest that the underlying problems targeted by these "wars" are not real or urgent. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the effect that the marketing and presentation of the problem might have not only on the public, but also on policymakers and stakeholders. It is also very important that such rhetoric not stifle or inhibit debate in the exploration of various viewpoints on the issue.
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Although the government appears to have recognized and to be taking the threat to and protection of trade secrets very seriously, the rhetoric of war that 94 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT 1, 9 (2011), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-059. is beginning to accompany the government's strategy for addressing the problem is likely to be counterproductive and not effective. Moreover, it might lead to a misplaced reliance on the government to address a problem that is, in the first instance, best addressed on a more micro, company level. Not only are putative trade secret owners required to take reasonable efforts to protect their trade secrets, but in the age of cyber intrusions and relatively invisible theft of trade secrets, it is a practical reality that cannot be overlooked. Whatever metaphorical war might be waging between the government and its enemies, there is no substitute for building stronger defenses in the private sector.
A. The Cyberwar
Threats from cyber espionage have been framed as threats to our national security. According to President Obama, it is "one of the most serious economic and national security challenges," 101 and a "rapidly growing threat."
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Heads of the FBI and national intelligence agencies have identified the cyber threat as the top global threat facing America, 103 rivaling and even surpassing that of terrorism. 104 In October 2012, President Obama signed a directive authorizing the federal government to act defensively and counterattack with cyber operations under the Presidential Policy Directive 20. 105 The directive instructs the government to identify potential foreign targets that could be the subject of "Offensive Cyber Effects Operations" if ordered by the President. 106 The directive appears to recommend preparation of counter cyberattacks against foreign threats, execution of cyber operations in the United States, and implementation of cyber intelligence-gathering against other nations. 107 Although the full extent of what is authorized under this directive remains unclear, as a whole it empowers the National Security Agency to fight cyber espionage by taking both proactive and defensive steps to deter these attacks.
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Some commentators have noted the effects of a cyberwar on the criminalization of conduct occurring online. For instance, some point to the aggressive use, expansion, and penalties under the CFAA and question whether it will actually serve as an effective deterrent.
109 Others point to the prosecution of those who download information that was already made public, as well as the move to upgrade hacking to a racketeering offense, which could snare potentially innocent players as members of a "criminal enterprise." 110 In particular, there is concern that cybersecurity professionals and researchers might be at risk due to the potentially overbroad laws or overzealous enforcement.
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Concerns have also been raised that the government might effectively be treating hacking as an act of war by equating hacking tools to weapons of war. For instance, a rule proposed by the Bureau of Industry and Security seeks to create a new definition of "intrusion software," making it more difficult to export computer security tools.
112 Security researchers are concerned that these new classifications might inhibit their work.
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B. Parallels to the "War on Drugs"
In thinking about the rhetoric of war as used in the context of cyber espionage, and the possible implications stemming from the narrative of war to frame a problem, a useful analogy and point of reference is the earlier "War on Drugs" in the United States. It also serves as a reminder that criminal law, by itself, may not always be the best way to fix behavioral and societal issues, even when those issues appear on a large scale. It is widely believed, even by 107 See id. at 4, 6-7. 108 In the same way, companies would be well served to similarly prepare against attacks and intrusions to their proprietary information. 109 113 See Singh, supra note 95 ("The new proposal is irking security researchers, who find exporting controls on vulnerability research a regulation of the flow of information.").
the current administration, that the war rhetoric was "counterproductive" for drug enforcement. 114 President George H.W. Bush's first address to the nation in 1989 began, "All of us agree that the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is drugs."
115 The War on Drugs, which began under the Nixon Administration but intensified under the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, was accompanied by a great expansion of government authority, including wiretapping, search warrants, and civil forfeiture laws.
116 But many have argued that it did not lead to significant positive changes. 117 One lesson for the cyber misappropriation problem might be that more focus is needed on the people and their motivations, rather than a tunnel-vision focus on enforcement. Knowing why people hack, what motivates them to do it, and what they hope to gain from it might actually lead to addressing the problem on a deeper level and place us in a better position to find solutions.
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C. Who Is the Enemy?
If news and government reports 119 are any measure, the face of our cyberwar enemy-who must be feared and stopped-is China and its hacking crews. Some refer to it as a "fake war" 120 ongoing between China and the United States, as the two giants hurl accusations and threats against each other for cyber intrusions and theft of trade secrets. Although there is documented evidence that Chinese companies have attempted to steal and have successfully 114 the precise measure and scale is unknown. 123 Coincidentally, this bears some resemblance to the presence of a common enemy in the War on Drugs.
124 Nevertheless, the fact is that trade secret holders have a universal base of potential enemies from whom to protect their trade secrets. Regardless of the extent of China's involvement in cyber misappropriation, it would be wise not to be distracted by the news media's constant focus on China and its hackers, and focus more on security protocols to protect trade secrets. As one commentator has amusingly noted, "The Chinese are like the Kardashians . . . . [Y]ou mention China in an attack, and every radio or news station picks it up." 125 Thus, taking steps to protect information, no matter who or what the source of the intrusion or misappropriation, must remain the paramount concern. To that end, this section will explore how the Internet, foreign governments, employees, and outside hackers all stand as formidable enemies in the battle to protect companies' crown jewels. on the Internet by employees or outsiders, and the resulting loss of trade secret protection from that conduct. This Article views the Internet danger from a different angle: as a borderless medium that allows stealth intrusions (and thus misappropriation) of trade secrets by anyone from anywhere in the world. In addition, the interconnected nature of the Internet provides the tie that binds governments and businesses, public and private sectors, and national and international parties. It provides the ease and the framework with which intruders can infect systems, ultimately affecting individual businesses and large-scale economies in the process.
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The tools available for those interested in committing cybercrimes have become widely available, and are not reserved for those with the highest levels of training and expertise. In fact, there is a hot and active market for "zeroday" exploits, Trojans, botnets, and other do-it-yourself kits, as well as easy connections between buyers and sellers in this underworld. 129 This easy access and entry for those with malicious motivations place trade secrets at significant risk.
Foreign Governments
Foreign governments have used strategic cyberattacks in growing numbers, 130 and some view these as geopolitical assaults on the United States.
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Alleged threats from Syria, China, and Russia illustrate how the problem becomes a national security threat rather than simply an economic issue. 133 Commentators have discussed the ways in which these foreign countries have infiltrated and attacked targets in the United States, generally gaining access to the media, the providers of public infrastructure services, and implicating more than trade secrets. 134 There is even a real-time world map that one can view to observe attack origins and targets as they occur.
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Many countries, including Russia, France, Israel, India, Japan, Taiwan, and China, allegedly engage in cyber espionage against U.S. companies. In our rhetoric of war, however, one public enemy emerges in the narrative, and that appears to be China. 136 According to one public official, "[The Chinese] are stealing everything that isn't bolted down, and it's getting exponentially worse."
137 One report accuses the Chinese of being "the world's most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage." 138 The close relationship between the Chinese military and its state-owned companies might also contribute to its position as chief culprit. The U.S. government believes that up to fifty percent of the Chinese economy is controlled by the state, and that industrial espionage is an articulated mission of its intelligence services. 139 Both the government and private companies have also implicated China in alleged thefts of proprietary and trade secret information. 143 Moreover, because hackers can disguise the source of their attacks by spoofing an Internet Provider address ("IP address"), it is possible that attacks that appear to be coming from China might actually have originated elsewhere, including within the United States. 144 Whether the enemy is a Chinese attacker, a Russian crime group, or an angry former employee, a focus on protecting and defending one's own proprietary information, rather than relying on the government to fight an enemy or battle, is ultimately the most productive and effective way to stem the loss of company trade secrets.
In a recent case, a group of Chinese defendants were indicted under the EEA and the CFAA for wide-scale theft of trade secrets against several American companies, spanning from 2006 to 2014. 145 This case provides an illustration of the ways in which foreign governments or entities can use technology to obtain access to and steal trade secrets. According to the indictment, members of the Chinese military conspired to hack into the computer systems of several businesses in order to steal trade secret information for the benefit of Chinese competitors. 146 For instance, one of the defendants is alleged to have stolen proprietary and confidential designs and specifications for pipes for a nuclear power plant that Westinghouse Electric Company was contracted to build. 147 SolarWorld, a German solar product company operating in the United States, was also allegedly hacked by the defendants, and thousands of emails containing information such as cost structures and production capabilities were stolen.
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One of the defendants was also charged with using a tactic called "spear phishing" to obtain access to computers at U.S. Steel Corporation.
149 This involved sending an email message to an employee at U.S. Steel that was designed to trick the employee into allowing the defendant access to the company's computers. 150 Senior managers at Alcoa Inc., an aluminum manufacturer, were also targeted with spear phishing messages in an attempt to obtain trade secrets. 151 The spear phishing messages usually looked like emails from colleagues, and contained attached files or hyperlinks within the messages that, once opened, would install malware or malicious code onto the computer system, thus creating a "backdoor."
152 The defendants, acting as co-conspirators, tried to mask the identity and location of the computers from which they were operating their hacking activities by using "hop points," or computers belonging to other victims. 
Employees, Hackers, and RATs
Ironically, although companies are likely to believe that attackers and misappropriators will be hackers, foreign governments, competitors, and others outside of the company, the reality is that the biggest threat to company trade secrets has always been from the inside. Employees and others with access to the inside of the business are responsible for a large majority of trade secret theft, whether through cyber misappropriation or otherwise.
154 Misappropriation from insiders is also likely to be more costly 155 to companies. 156 Accordingly, as we continue to fight the battle in cybersecurity and to protect trade secrets, it is important to remember that building technological walls to defend against invaders and intruders is only part of the solution. Instead, even more careful consideration must be paid to the humans who are already inside of the 148 Id. at 4-5. 149 Id. at 6. 150 Id. 151 Id. at 7. 152 Id. at 9. 153 Id. at 9-10. 154 See, e.g., RANTALA, supra note 59,at 2 (reporting that in 2005, 75% of cyber thefts were due to business insiders). 155 gates, and who are able and willing to use deception and other vices to obtain sensitive information. 157 Several recent cases illustrate how humans and technology can be a perilous combination when it comes to keeping trade secrets safe. The former employees of an executive search firm allegedly used their usernames and passwords to copy and download trade secret information from a company database before leaving to start a competitive venture. 158 A government employee used his work computer to download and transfer files containing source code from the Citadel. 159 In another case, a Massachusetts employee on the verge of being terminated ordered his assistant in China to encrypt secret project files on the company's Chinese server. 160 The files were then condensed, passwordprotected, and sent to the employee at home, and the original files were destroyed. 161 This effectively blocked the company from accessing its own files after the defendant left because he refused to divulge the password. 162 Competitors are often involved, either directly or indirectly, with alleged acts of cyber misappropriation. In one case, competitors accused each other of stealing electronically stored trade secrets, such as pricing and sales information, customer lists, and customer profiles. 163 The accused company in the case allegedly hacked into the plaintiff's computers and website, gaining access to passwords and login information with which it later obtained trade secrets. 164 Over a period of about three years, employees were also allegedly involved in supplying secret information to the competitor before leaving to join that competitor. 165 One company allegedly induced a disloyal employee to steal proprietary financial modeling software from a competitor after the competitor had turned down an offer to purchase the company's business unit. 166 This employee was a trusted director of information technology at the company, and he allegedly accessed about 15,000 confidential computer files and emailed them to the competitor. 167 He also downloaded and copied the plaintiff's proprietary busi-ness models onto a laptop for the benefit of the competitor and his soon-to-be new employer.
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Websites can be fair game as a source for trade secret misappropriation, as well. One company used the login name and password of a subscriber to its competitor's website in order to "sneak in" to view information available to the competitor's subscribers. 169 Its officers also allegedly hacked into the source code used by the competitor to operate its website, taking advantage of a backdoor opportunity created by the competitor's failure to install a patch that had been distributed by Microsoft. 170 In another case, the defendant company and its employee allegedly hacked into a competitor's website by sending "electronic robots" to launch attacks and steal confidential source code and confidential customer information. 171 This kind of "extraction software" is used to search, copy, and retrieve information from websites. 172 The plaintiff was able to track the attacks to IP addresses tied to the defendant competitor.
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Hacking refers to a wide range of activities where a person intrudes upon or accesses a system belonging to another without the appropriate authorization. 174 Not only can computers be hacked, but virtually any other device or equipment that contains a computing system can also be vulnerable, such as cars, airplanes, and medical devices. 175 Indeed, right around the corner, the "Internet of things"-which is predicated on people being more connected to their devices-may leave consumers and trade secret owners even more vulnerable. 176 The digital components found in cars, insulin pumps, pacemakers, and even home refrigerators will provide more of a playground and greater opportunities for hackers. Although insiders or employees can certainly be hackers, 178 the term in the context of trade secret misappropriation typically tends to refer to outsiders. For example, a citizen of Sweden was extradited to the United States after he was indicted on several counts of conspiracy to commit computer hacking. 179 He was the founder of an organization that developed malware, which included a remote access tool that could remotely control the victims' computers by capturing their keystrokes and searching through their files. 180 The RAT could also scan hard drives for other confidential information such as credit card numbers. 181 In 2014, there were highly publicized hacks at such wellknown companies as Target, Home Depot, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Sony. 182 The kinds of information obtained from these hacks included not only consumer information like credit card information, but confidential, trade secret information as well.
There appears to be a thriving cybercrime market for this kind of trade secret information, and the kinds of tools that allow hacking are now widely and easily available.
183 Accordingly, gone are the days when only those with the highest computer programming skill levels could engage in this behavior. Today, one can hire a hacker or purchase exploit kits that contain all the software for creating and managing attacks. 184 It has also become the province of organized crime, perhaps in some ways easier and more lucrative than selling drugs. 185 The demographic characteristics of the typical hacker today suggests that person is likely to be male and under the age of thirty. 186 Hackers can include everyone from spies to dissatisfied employees, political activists, and even teenagers playing computer games.
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Hackers are not, however, all cut from the same cloth. Distinctions are being made between "good" hackers and "bad" hackers, or "ethical" hackers and "unethical" hackers. There is even a color-coding system for the various categories, with intent separating White Hats from Black and Grey Hats. Hats tend to be security researchers who are hired to find security flaws.
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Black Hats access systems to commit a crime, and Grey Hats are between the two, sometimes crossing the line in violating the law, but choosing to report security vulnerabilities. 190 Indeed, many hackers believe that unless their access is motivated by malicious intent, the practice should be legitimate. 191 The term "hacktivist" refers to those who hack for politically motivated reasons, trying to send a political message through a civil disobedience model. 192 Companies' trade secrets can be caught in the crossfire, as these hackers might seek to embarrass the company or harm its reputation. 193 Some companies hire hackers or former hackers to test the vulnerabilities of their systems. This practice can be controversial. 194 Some argue that it provides the wrong incentives to hackers, in that it may serve as a pathway to landing a great job. 195 One could also question whether companies should trust "reformed hackers" with such access to their systems. 196 Some companies now offer "bug bounty programs," providing rewards to hackers who identify vul-nerabilities. 197 One of the many criticisms of the CFAA is that it captures and criminalizes all kinds of hackers, including legitimate security researchers. 198 
IV. EXPLORING SELF-HELP AND SELF-DEFENSE
In the United States, there is no centralized government control or regulation of the Internet. Instead, the private sector, and in particular each company, is responsible for securing its own networks. 199 Companies cannot afford to rely on the government or on law enforcement to stem cyber misappropriation of their trade secrets. One drawback of the war rhetoric is that it might lead to an overreliance on the government to "fight the war," rather than focus on each company's ability and obligation to protect its own trade secrets. Under both the state civil law requirements and the EEA, putative trade secret owners must engage in reasonable efforts to protect confidential information before it receives the protected status of a trade secret. As will be discussed below, this sets the floor for a certain level of active efforts, appropriate to the circumstances, by which each company must act to guard its trade secrets.
The most likely source for trade secret misappropriation is still an insider, such as an employee or a business partner. 200 Even though cyber misappropriation from an outsider will be a less likely occurrence, these intrusions can be particularly damaging, especially if the attacker uses a sophisticated technique. For example, when employing an advanced persistent threat, the attacker breaches and lurks in the company's computer systems for months or years, monitoring activities and gathering information.
tive in defending against all potential attacks through computers and the Internet, regardless of the source. It is also why relying solely on criminal laws or government policy to sufficiently protect individual businesses in the cat and mouse game of cyber misappropriation is an approach that will lead, at best, to unsatisfactory results without a self-help component. This Part will explore several initiatives, including self-help, self-defense, and government actions, as well as special considerations related to smaller companies, as they tend to be overshadowed and overlooked in discussions about cybersecurity and cyber misappropriation.
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A. Reasonable Efforts
In almost every state, the reasonable efforts requirement is embedded in the threshold legal question of trade secret misappropriation analysis: whether the plaintiff owns a legally protectable trade secret. 204 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), which has been officially adopted by forty-seven states and the District of Columbia, 205 includes reasonable efforts as part of the definition of a trade secret. 206 Reasonable efforts require that in order to qualify for trade secret protection, the information must be "the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." 207 The states that have not adopted the UTSA rely on the older codification of trade secret law in the Restatement (First) of Torts. 208 Even the Restatement (First) of Torts, however, requires a trade secret holder to show more than mere intent to protect something as a trade secret; actual effort to keep the information secret is necessary. 209 Thus, the Restatement (First) of Torts includes "the extent of measures taken by [the trade secret owner] to guard the secrecy of the information" as one of six factors to be considered in determining whether information qualifies as a trade secret.
Similar to the UTSA, the EEA also includes a reasonable efforts requirement in defining a trade secret. 211 The EEA requires that "the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret."
212 This provision withstood a void for vagueness challenge in federal district court, with the court finding that the term "reasonable measures" is not unconstitutionally vague. 213 As a result, the showing of actual effort to preserve secrecy, required since codification of the Restatement (First) of Torts, 214 continues to be applicable under the EEA and in both UTSA and non-UTSA jurisdictions. The requirement is securely grounded in trade secret jurisprudence.
Although the above sources of law provide the underpinning for the reasonable efforts requirement, they do not provide precise standards for the courts on how to determine whether the requirement has been met. 215 The interpretation of the requirement appears to be similar in all jurisdictions such that for the purposes of this Article no further distinctions are necessary between UTSA and non-UTSA states. Whether a trade secret owner has utilized appropriate safeguards sufficient to meet the reasonable efforts requirement is a question of fact, based on the particular circumstances. 216 These decisions necessitate a balancing between using sufficient precautions to protect a company's secret on the one hand, without imposing overly burdensome precautions that would impair the functioning of its business on the other hand.
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The inquiry necessarily calls for a cost-benefit analysis, which varies in each case based on the costs of the protective measures relative to the attendant benefits of protecting the information. 218 The costs to the trade secret owner will not only include direct financial costs, but also indirect costs, such as the ability to make appropriate use of the information in the business by sharing it with employees and others who need to use it. 219 In the context of cyber misappropriation and cybersecurity generally, there is no such thing as an impenetrable fortress. Fortunately, the reasonable fort or money expended by [the business] in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Id.
211 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2012 efforts requirement does not mandate absolute secrecy. 220 "Rather, the standard is one of relative secrecy; a trade secret owner needs to take steps that are reasonably necessary under the circumstances to maintain secrecy." 221 A plaintiff in trade secret litigation must show that it took affirmative steps and concrete efforts to preserve the confidentiality of the alleged secret information. 222 Some courts note that in addition to requiring employees to sign confidentiality agreements, "reasonable efforts" can include "advising employees of the existence of a trade secret, limiting access to the information on a 'need to know basis,' . . . and keeping secret documents under lock." 223 Other reasonable efforts include "[t]he use of security guards, closed-circuit television monitors, access codes for information stored on a computer, and varying security access levels for different areas of the facilities." 224 Efforts to protect secrecy are also tied to the requirement that trade secrets have value. Whether or not a company took adequate steps to protect a secret is considered evidence of the subjective belief that the information was a trade secret, and therefore worthy of protection. 225 For example, Some courts may reason that there is a direct relationship between the value of the information and the extent to which the company made efforts to protect it such that the more valuable the information to the company, the more costly or extensive the measures ought to be to protect it. 226 Furthermore, where a plaintiff makes a strong showing of reasonable efforts to protect trade secret information, a court is more likely to infer that the defendant improperly obtained the information. 227 But a trade secret owner who is lax about taking precautions to guard the secret cannot expect to prevent others from using it. 228 Thus, "a court may use the reasonable efforts requirement to deny a plaintiff any protection under trade secret law." 229 Even when a plaintiff creates a trade secret protection plan providing for how secrets will be safeguarded, a court could find, vis-à-vis the hypothetical reasonable person, that failure to adequately follow the plan is unreasonable conduct. 230 
B. Introducing TRAP
In order to effectively combat the kinds of remote access tools, or RATs, that can remotely control a victim's computer and access their files, it is necessary that companies take a more active stance to protect their trade secrets. Accessing remotely without needing to be on the same premises has opened up the world of potential perpetrators, setting up an unwieldy cat and mouse game. Accordingly, this Article introduces the acronym TRAP for "technologically responsive active protection" to serve as a guiding principle that further refines the reasonable efforts requirement for the protection of trade secrets. Consistent with every putative trade secret owner's duty to protect its trade secrets, rather than being passive in its efforts, TRAP reinforces the need to take initiative and be self-reliant in preparing and implementing security plans to protect against trade secret misappropriation through electronic means.
The enormous challenges that technology presents through the interconnected framework of the Internet raises the stakes in protecting proprietary information. The larger problem of cybersecurity and espionage is clearly a matter of national concern, and a cooperative stance between the public and private sectors will always be essential. Nevertheless, each company must build its own fortress in this "war," rather than rely on external sources for protection. Active protection certainly requires consideration of technological tools. The use of such tools to protect, hide, or fight back must be considered. For example, some companies build fake networks, create fake documents, or build beacons into their documents that provide more information about who has taken property, not just that it was compromised. 231 Although many of these tools are considered passive, other more aggressive techniques are beginning to emerge as options. Hacking back is an example of an active defense mechanism, but one that is controversial. The nature of that controversy will be further explored later in this Part. 232 Many companies do not invest sufficiently in cybersecurity and protecting their trade secret information. 233 Moreover, to the extent that a company's network may be interconnected with others, vulnerability can be shared on a larger scale as companies increasingly connect over the Internet. 234 Thus, guarding and protecting one's own secrets and assets has benefits beyond each individual company. The private sector can therefore, as a practical matter, play an important role in increasing security.
Companies may choose not to invest, or to invest minimally, in security for a host of reasons. The financial costs associated with shoring up networks and computers can be a deterrent, especially when for many companies the return on investment is uncertain. 235 This problem can be particularly acute with small businesses. 236 Not only are the financial costs more likely to be burdensome, but these businesses might be more likely to underestimate or downplay their risks. 237 Small businesses are also less likely to have the kinds of internal policies in place to secure their information. 238 Technologically responsive active protection encompasses the view that as a result of technology, trade secret protection has become far more difficult. As such, effective approaches must account for these technological advances, including the interconnectedness of all systems and the intangibility of the kinds of information that companies seek to protect. Accordingly, reasonable efforts to protect trade secrets in this context must be active and ongoing, and must integrate people and processes for optimal protection. Indeed, because the existence of technological controls might in itself create a false sense of security, it is imperative that the role of the people in implementing technological processes effectively be underscored.
Although much is made of the role of technological responses to combating trade secret misappropriation and other kinds of cyberattacks, the role of human behavior is largely overlooked despite its prevalence: "[H]uman error accounts for 35%-53.5% of cyber breaches caused by preventable employee error or sabotage from within a company in both the public and private sectors."
239 Another recent report found that over 60% of the electronic espionage cases in 2014 involved opening emails with malicious links or attachments.
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Yet another report in 2014 places the number of security incidents attributable to human error at an even higher rate of 95%. 241 Apparently, it is such a sure thing that employees will open these kinds of emails that "sending emails to just ten employees will get hackers inside a corporation's system 90 per cent of the time."
242 So important is the role that employees play within any organization's security protection program that some companies, Lockheed Martin for instance, employ tactics such as tricking their employees into opening suspi- 237 cious emails to help ensure that their message on security is actually being implemented. 243 The reasons why employees misappropriate trade secrets, even without criminal intent, can be due to a wide range of factors, including complacency, apathy, ignorance, and stress. 244 But regardless of motivation, the primary line of defense in protecting trade secrets must account for employees and their human tendencies. 245 Accordingly, employees must be appropriately trained as well as informed about protecting the company's trade secrets and confidential information, and security procedures must be strictly enforced.
A well-considered security plan will include analysis of both internal and external risks, consider the nature of the trade secret information to be protected, appropriately tailor reasonable security measures to protect the sensitive information, and ensure ongoing assessment and review of the security plan in order to update what weaknesses appear. 246 Experts believe that even the most basic steps to protect against cyber intrusions could prevent about eighty percent of such attacks. 247 How money is spent is also of significance. For instance, it is best that companies do more than just protect against perimeter attacks generally designed to detect breaches, and become more aware of developing intelligence about threats. 248 It is also highly recommended that companies encrypt information so that even if it is stolen, it will have no value to the thief. 249 Looking ahead, it will be interesting to see the role that insurance plays in encouraging companies to beef up their security. As companies purchase policies to reduce their expected losses from attacks, insurance companies will likely play a role in helping to develop best practices, as well as encouraging companies to adopt those practices to reduce their premiums or as a precondi-tion to coverage. 250 This might serve as a motivating factor for companies to invest in technological and other tools to protect against misappropriation. The best security plans must also account for human error, recognizing that even the smartest technological tools can be undermined by human behavior. 251 Although this Part so far has discussed technological tools generally as one large grouping, the next section 252 separates out passive tools from the more controversial active defense tools, illustrating that choices for active protection lie along a spectrum.
C. Active Defense and Hacking Back
Defensive measures to computer security include firewalls, encryption, automated detection of intrusions, and education of employees and users of computer systems. 253 In the parlance of cybersecurity, these are considered passive measures. 254 Somewhere between these passive measures and more active defense measures are approaches that, for instance, use decoy sites to attract hackers. These are known as "honeypots." 255 Honeypots can be created to work as traps to capture information about intrusions. 256 One limitation of honeypots is that they only work when there has been direct communication from an attacker. 257 Another method known as a "sandbox" isolates execution of code to help better protect the integrity of an entire system that may be infected with malicious code. 258 A limitation of this approach is that the sandbox could be bypassed. 259 Accordingly, some commentators believe that reliance on passive defense features alone are insufficient for optimum protection, 260 and others consider honeypots and sandboxes to be active defenses rather than passive. 261 On the other end of the spectrum from passive defense mechanisms are active defenses. More active and offensive measures are beginning to emerge as companies become more proactive against hacking. An active defense allows a company to detect an intrusion, trace it, and actively respond to the threat. This could include interrupting an attack in progress in order to lessen the damage that it may cause, all the way to counter-striking the attacker. 262 The technique of beaconing is also an active defense technique that, when attached to an electronic file, alerts when it has left an authorized network and also potentially identifies its location in the event it is stolen. 263 Other versions of this type of decoy or trap on files to detect attacks include techniques known as "web bugging," "meta-tagging," 264 and "watermarking." 265 Another more aggressive approach might be inserting code into confidential files so that if stolen, the data would self-destruct. 266 New business models are also emerging to assist corporations in dealing with the problem. Innovative companies are developing technology to assist companies in their defense against online threats. CrowdStrike, Endgame, and CloudFare are examples of startups entering this market. 267 
The Hacking Back Controversy
The pursuit of active defense is currently very controversial. 268 This is so for legal, technical, and political reasons. There are those who argue strongly in favor of this approach and those who oppose it. The larger debate in this area is usually about cyberattacks generally, including not just businesses but public infrastructure, wider national security issues, and international implications. 269 Continuing to draw on the war rhetoric in this area, active defense in military terms refers to "[t]he employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the enemy." 270 Interestingly, however, the White House and the Department of Defense have not adopted the uniform definition for "active defense" in the context of cybersecurity. 271 In technical and legal circles, the phrase generally refers to the use of technology to respond directly to attacks. 272 The Justice Department's position is that companies should not hack back into an attacker's computer. 273 Since this Article focuses specifically on trade secrets, it will not engage in that wider debate.
In 2010, a group from China allegedly hacked into Google's network and those of many other U.S. companies. 274 Not only did Google successfully trace the source of the attack, but it also engaged in a counter-offensive move to obtain evidence about the culprits. 275 This has come to be known as "hacking back." 276 Google is not alone among large companies that are beginning to retaliate or respond to hacking in this manner. 277 Another Fortune 500 company also allegedly used software that slowed an intrusion and blocked the hacker's computer from the company's website. 278 It is believed that more companies will pursue this option. 279 The full extent of these measures, as used by companies currently, are and will likely remain unknown. 280 For one thing, firms generally do not publicly disclose that they are engaging in this behavior for much the same reason that they keep private when they have been hacked. 281 Potential negative questions or publicity associated with hacking back might also serve to discourage such public announcements. 282 These measures no doubt remain controversial. 283 When a company hacks back it mounts a counterattack against its attacker, often trying to damage the perpetrator's system. There are various ways to do this, some of which might include trying to overload the servers from which the attack originated in an attempt to prevent them from continuing the intrusion, or directly hacking into the servers responsible for the original attack.
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One of the goals of the strategy is to de-incentivize and deter hackers while also improving corporate security. Some argue, however, that the deterrence effect is of limited use. 285 This kind of active defense strategy presents an opportunity to respond quickly to attacks, and some believe that, among other reasons, they may serve to deter hackers by increasing costs to them. 286 Nevertheless, the approach is not without its shortcomings and potential pitfalls. There is a chance, for instance, that these kinds of counterstrikes might miss their targets and hit the wrong ones, thereby harming innocent third parties. 287 Attackers can also disguise their location so that a counterstrike affects a third-party and not the perpetrator. 288 Attackers often "spoof" their IP ad-dresses in order to evade detection. 289 Thus, a strike back against the apparent origin of the attack might harm an innocent victim whose computer was used as a "zombie" by the hacker. 290 Another concern is that private companies' responses might be excessive or disproportionate as they eagerly pursue a retaliatory objective.
Legal Implications
Some of the complicated issues around hacking back or retaliatory cyberattacks include the legal implications and ability of this method to serve as an effective deterrent. It is unclear whether this behavior is legal, but it is evident that better guidelines will be needed to address when such activities are legitimate and which should be sanctioned. For instance, such conduct may violate the CFAA. 291 On the international level, there are also questions about state-to-state engagement, and conduct between private individuals or companies across borders.
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Consistency among definitions, beginning with what constitutes a cyberattack, would also be necessary. Cyberattacks tend to refer to "the use of deliberate actions . . . to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary computer systems or networks."
293 Perhaps more applicable to trade secrets, the term "cyber exploitations" often refers to actions that are not constructive, but that nonetheless remove confidential information from a network. 294 Nevertheless, the terms are often conflated with a cyberattack, referring to intrusions upon a network.
In any case, regardless of the terminology, counterstrikes like hacking back are highly controversial and potentially violate the CFAA. 295 Even those who favor the use of this kind of self-defense caution that more study and reg- 289 See Matthew Tanase, IP Spoofing: An Introduction, SYMANTEC (Nov. 2, 2010), http:// www.symantec.com/connect/articles/ip-spoofing-introduction [https://perma.cc/TA9P-73F2] ("In IP spoofing, an attacker gains unauthorized access to a computer or a network by making it appear that a malicious message has come from a trusted machine by 'spoofing' the IP address of that machine."). 290 ulation may be required in order to establish appropriate guidelines for legitimate use of counterstrikes that minimize collateral damage. 296 On some level, the practical reality suggests that any prosecution for this kind of behavior would be highly unlikely unless an innocent victim files a complaint or notifies law enforcement, especially since the hackers themselves will not be alerting law enforcement.
In drawing the appropriate lines, fine distinctions might be necessary to better match the legal ramifications with the technology. Questions abound. Which of these would be acceptable: destroying the attacker's system, limiting their bandwidth, and/or attaching a "beacon" to confidential files to allow notice when the file has left the authorized network and potentially identify the location of the file if it is stolen? 297 Should companies receive immunity for counterstrikes against hackers? Is striking against an attack analogous to selfdefense? Is it analogous to the "stand your ground" doctrine in criminal law? 298 All of these are questions that need further and deeper exploration as legislators and policymakers continue the debate and wrestle with this difficult area.
D. Education and Supplementary Initiatives
As we await resolution and answers on these active defense questions from policymakers in courts, it may be that one of the best ways to address cyberattacks generally, and cyber misappropriation specifically, is through education. In the longer term, educating children about cybersecurity and safe practices, in addition to developing an appreciation for the protection of trade secrets and intellectual property rights, can be a supplementary and complementary approach to the larger national issues in this area. Working toward a cultural shift in the way we think about cybersecurity can have the most lasting effect. In the short-term, educating small businesses is also critical.
As technology has become part of the fabric of the current culture in which children are raised, it is worth paying attention to the moral and legal norms that surround how technology is and should be used. Researchers have found that when one's peer group is involved in computer crime, this encourages others in the group to do the same. 299 Accordingly, there is a role for education to help shape socially acceptable and legally acceptable behaviors and norms in teaching children about access to computers. 300 Thus, to the extent 296 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 253, at 535-37 (arguing that a public-private partnership should be developed to regulate active defense and counterstriking). 297 See Harrington, supra note 263, at 9. 298 See Recent Developments-Florida Legislation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 351, 355 (2005) (discussing the Florida law that allows one to legally use force in self-defense without a duty to retreat). 299 See FITCH, supra note 188, at 11-12. 300 See id. at 13.
that hacking is seen as part of the fun and games attendant with technology, children and young adults must be taught what behaviors are legally acceptable and which are not. This is likely to help shape the collective consciousness over the long-term. To the extent that part of the attraction of hacking and other such activities is due to curiosity 301 and a sense of competition, educators may want to consider creating environments in which students can build on these skills in an appropriate educational framework. 302 Further, developing a greater understanding of the harm and costs to victims-as well as a respect for trade secrets and other proprietary informationcan go a long way to educate the public, particularly those that are not criminally motivated in the first place. For instance, there are those who believe that unless an intrusion is maliciously motivated, it is not unethical or illegal. 303 This is the kind of thinking that needs to be adjusted.
Small Companies
The larger discussions and voices around hacking, cyber misappropriation, and trade secret protection often are or make reference to large, wellknown companies. 304 The significance and implications for smaller companies also deserve attention, as a thorough exploration of this issue would be remiss without consideration of small companies. Indeed, trade secret law, because of its initial low cost to entry and lack of government formalities to obtain its protections, is widely used and heavily relied upon by small businesses. 305 Ironically, they are also the entities that are probably less likely to be willing to expend large sums of money on reasonable efforts to protect their trade secrets. Nor are they likely to have the same level of access to attorneys and other advisors (including internal IT departments) to advise them of the importance of protecting their trade secrets in general and defending against cyber misappropriation in particular.
According to a recent report from Symantec, about sixty percent of cyberattacks in 2014 were aimed at small 306 and medium-sized businesses. This represented an increase of about thirty percent from the previous year. 308 It suggests that not only are these businesses themselves at risk, but other companies with which they do business are also at risk, especially when the smaller business partner has its systems connected to those of the larger entity. The vulnerability can create a back-door access to proprietary information, placing the entire supply chain at risk.
309
Smaller companies may suffer from the misconception that they are not fruitful targets for cyberattackers, and as such may not be willing, or sometimes simply not financially able, to invest sufficiently in securing their confidential information. 310 Instead, these companies tend to rely on antivirus protection as their defensive stronghold. 311 As a result of not paying enough attention to their security, however, they make themselves easier targets, placing the sensitive information belonging to those with whom they do business (both businesses and consumers) at even greater risk. 312 In addition to limited budgets and expertise to implement comprehensive security protocols, small businesses often are not as aware of the risks, and do not train their employees to identify risks or to engage in safer conduct. 313 Although they cannot be expected to have the same level of complex systems in place as larger entities, smaller businesses still must engage in reasonable efforts (that best match the enterprise) to protect their trade secrets. Accordingly, educating and raising awareness among this large and most vulnerable segment of trade secret owners is critical.
Government Initiatives
Law enforcement itself is also resorting to technological tools in the fight against cyber espionage. In September 2013, the Department of Justice recommended an amendment to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-dure that would expand the territorial limits for searching electronic data. 314 In effect, this would authorize courts to issue warrants that would be executed by remotely accessing computers located outside the district where the court is located. The idea is that it would allow law enforcement to investigate crimes involving botnets and other anonymizing technologies used in cybercrime. Under the proposed amendment to Rule 41, Law enforcement could seek a warrant either where the electronic media to be searched are within the United States or where the location of the electronic media is unknown. In the latter case, should the media searched prove to be outside the United States, the warrant would have no extraterritorial effect, but the existence of the warrant would support the reasonableness of the search. 315 Although this certainly might make it easier to conduct investigations, both domestically and internationally, the propriety of these programs used to conduct remote searches will raise constitutional and territorial questions. 316 To the extent that government regulatory agencies have begun to mandate reporting or greater security within companies, this could also serve to encourage further investment in security. For instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") issued guidance in October 2011 requiring companies to report "material information regarding cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents." 317 Such disclosures are also tied to the relevant insurance coverage. Those two forces, insurance in the private marketplace coupled with governmental regulation, might provide other ways to incentivize at least those companies within the SEC's reach. 318 The Obama Administration is also considering amending the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act to include computer fraud: a move that would mean significant increases in penalties. 319 The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, which was passed by the House of Representatives in April 2013, included an amendment that did not permit hacking back. 320 But the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014, designed to enhance and provide protections from liability for sharing of information between private corporate entities and the government, was passed out of the Senate Intelligence Committee. 321 
Approaches Outside the United States
Because challenges related to cybersecurity are occurring on a global scale, it is no surprise that the governments of many countries have undertaken plans and initiatives to address them. Along with the United States, among the countries taking serious note are Canada, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 322 The United States is arguably the leader in thinking about and attempting to integrate cybersecurity in both the political and business sphere. 323 With respect to the use of self-defense measures by the private sector, there is no general consensus (as of yet) on the issue. There is a proposal in the Netherlands to permit law enforcement officials to hack internationally, but the proposal does not discuss private parties. 324 Similarly, Israeli Defense forces have the right to use "offensive cyber operations," but Israel takes no position on whether those in the private sector are permitted to do so. 325 In Germany, however, it is illegal to hack back. 326 Nevertheless, German companies have reportedly used hacking back, and the practice appears to be tolerated. 327 Countries are likely to approach this complicated issue in different ways to account for their unique cultural, government, and business sector concerns. The European Union, for instance, appears to be taking the approach of implementing mandatory standards, whereas the United States has tended more toward self-regulation. 328 Moving forward, there is a need to build a con-sensus on these kinds of active self-defense measures, both within the private sector and between nations.
CONCLUSION
This Article has undertaken the formidable task of exploring cyber misappropriation and espionage within the larger problem of cybersecurity in the United States. Recognizing the significance of economic espionage to our national economy and national security, the government has embraced the rhetoric of war to frame the larger debate. This Article cautions that companies ultimately must look inward and re-conceptualize their roles, not as bystanders or onlookers, but as participants responsible for building their own TRAPs and fortresses to protect their trade secrets and proprietary information. Reliance on legislative and judicial intervention and enforcement alone will never be enough to offer adequate protection in a world where technologies, like RATs, permit easy access to American companies' trade secrets from anywhere in the world. Self-help is the first line of defense, without which the "war" cannot be won. Using TRAP as a guiding principle, companies may need to implement a layered security system that covers personnel as well as technology in order to mitigate risks. Even though perfect security is impossible to achieve, active protection can serve to lower risks of trade secret misappropriation through cyber misappropriation.
